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1.  Introduction 
 
The main goal of this paper is to study the efficiency of Colombian schools with an eye 
on understanding what drives school productivity and how much is to be gained by 
increasing efficiency. The paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to study 
efficiency and a Tobit model to study the determinants of efficiency. 
 
This is not the first paper to look at the efficiency of secondary schools in Colombia. 
Gaviria and Barrientos (2001) look at the determinants of test scores in the city of 
Bogotá. They find that public schools produce lower scores than private schools after 
controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. More importantly, they find that teachers’ 
education and infrastructure positively affect scores in private schools but not in public 
schools, which suggests the existence of inefficiencies in publicly provided education. 
Nunez et al. (2002) look at the differences between private and public secondary schools 
in both urban and rural areas for the year 1999. They find that public schools produce, on 
average, lower scores. However, at the bottom of the distribution, public schools appear 
to be better than private schools. Finally, Barrera (2003) finds that test scores in both 
public and private schools increased in the last decade, but that private school scores 
increased more than public school ones.  
 
                                                 
1 Juan Camilo Chaparro provided exceptional research assistance in the final stages of the paper. Katja 
Vinha read several version and made important comments. Harry Patrinos and Vicente Paqueo made as 
well critical comments. Also, we received very useful comments from participants at a seminar in 
Fedesarrollo.    Initially for the investigation, we analyzed the case of Bogotá. However, given the 
disparity between this city and the rest of the country and a desire to include municipal 
level variation, we decided to expand the study to the national level. The results, as we 
will show, change dramatically in the two samples.  We will, therefore, present the results 
using the national sample and analyze the specific case of Bogotá separately.  
 
The paper has the following structure. In the second part, we describe the main 
methodology used in the analysis. The third part presents the results for the whole 
country. The next section includes a discussion of the potential role of costs of public 
versus private education. Finally we close the paper with some general conclusions. In 
the Appendix we present the analysis of Bogotá as a particular case.  
 
2.  Description of methodology 
 
This section describes the methodology used in the paper. The analysis consists of three 
steps.  First, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to compute the relative 
efficiency, or efficiency score, of schools.  Then a Tobit regression is used to study the 
determinants of school efficiency scores in Colombia. Special attention is paid to the 
differences of private versus public schools in Colombia. Finally, we use indirect 
evidence, based mainly on household data, to get a sense of the cost differentials between 
private and public schools.  
 
As customary in this literature
2, we assume that schools produce a set of outputs (e.g., 
standardized test scores) by using a set of inputs (e.g., number of teachers and mean 
schooling).  As a rule, factors that can be influenced by the schools are included in the 
DEA models, whereas factors beyond the scope of decision making power of schools are 
included in the analysis of the determinants of efficiency. The first type of factors 
includes teacher’s education and teacher-pupil rations and the second type includes 
student’s socioeconomic attributes, and whether the school is public.  
 
                                                 
2 For a good review of the literature on DEA analysis and education, see Lovell, Walters and Wood (1994). DEA is a non-parametric method that uses the information about the levels of inputs and 
outputs used by each school to (i) determine a frontier of efficiency and (ii) to compute 
how far from this frontier any single observation is located.  Observations under the 
frontier are inefficient in that it is possible either to reduce the use of inputs to achieve the 
same level of output or to increase the production of output with the same amount of 
inputs. It bears stressing that the frontier is build from the most efficient observations in 
the sample. Therefore, the estimated frontier does not necessarily coincide with the true 
production frontier. 
 
In this paper, we use an input-oriented distance function to compute the extent of 
inefficiency (i.e., how far is a school from the frontier). Simply put, input-oriented 
distances are computed as the ratio of the quantity an efficient school would have used to 
produce a unit of output to the actual quantity used by the school in question. Thus, if an 
efficient school uses two units of a given input to produce two units of output, and the 
school being evaluated uses four units of the same input to produce the same two units of 
the output, it will have a technical efficiency of 50%.  The same simple logic could be 
generalized for the case in which there are various inputs and outputs.  
 
A linear program is used to compute the efficiency scores for each school in the sample. 
Assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) and considering that only one output is being 





































ix v  
0 , > i v u  where the subscripts i and j are used to identify the inputs and the schools, the variables 
y0 and x0 denote the output and inputs of the school being evaluated, g0 denotes the 
corresponding efficiency score, yj the observed output for school j, xij the observed level 
of inputs. Finally, u and vj are the weights determined by the solution of the program.  
 
The literature offers many thorough depictions of the technical aspects of this 
methodology. To understand the basic intuition, it suffices to focus on the objective 
function and the first constraint. The program consists of choosing u and vj so as to 
maximize the efficiency score of school 0 subject to the constraint that the efficiency 
score of no other school exceeds one. Because this program doesn’t have a unique 
solution, the second normalizing constraint is added. The non-negativity constraints 
guarantee that output cannot be lowered by increasing inputs. 
 
The assumption of CRS can be relaxed by introducing a new variable in the numerator of 



































0 , > i v u  
where u0 is the new variable and z0 the efficiency scores under the assumption of variable 
returns to scale (VRS). A positive u0 implies increasing returns to scale. A negative u0 
implies the opposite. In the empirical work, we first estimate efficiency scores assuming 
both constant and variable returns to scale and then compare the estimated values of g0 









ix vIn the second step of the analysis, we regress the efficiency scores on a set of average 
socioeconomic characteristics of the students and on dummy variable showing whether 
the school in question is public.  Our goal is to shed some light on the determinants of 
school efficiency. From previous research on the topic, we gather that efficiency to be 
smaller in public schools and in schools that have a greater proportion of disadvantage 
students. 
 




The data used in this paper come from two sources: (i) data on test scores and on 
socioeconomic characteristics of the students come from the Colombian Institute of 
Superior Education (ICFES) and (ii) data on school attributes, including indicators of 
teachers’ education and school infrastructure come from the Colombia Bureau of 
Statistics (DANE). Test scores correspond to school means of the ICFES test, a test 
equivalent of the American SAT, taken by most Colombian student upon finishing high 
school and for all students aspiring to enter college and is used by most universities to 
screen candidates. Socioeconomic attributes are computed using a survey responded by 
students six months before the test. School attributes are computed using a census of 
schools performed yearly by DANE. We include both private and public schools. Schools 
were fewer than six students took the test in 1999 were excluded from the sample. 
Although we attempt to include as many schools as possible, some have to be dropped of 
the sample because we couldn’t merge the data on test scores and students characteristics 
with the data on school attributes.
3 
 
                                                 
3 Merging was is complicated because school identifications numbers do not coincide in both data sets. We 
use school names and phone numbers to circumvent this problem. We exclude nine departments from the analysis, mainly because of sharp differences 
between them and the rest of the Colombian departments.
4 Overall, the sample includes 
3.363 schools and around 230.000 students. Main summary statistics are presented in 
Table 1. Mean test scores at the national level are 244,72 points. Years of mean parental 
education are around 10 years, and the respectively statistic for teachers is close to 16 
years. The teacher-pupil ratio is 0.06; the fraction of schools with computer facilities is 
0.88. The percentage of schools with no libraries is 5%, with one library is 79% and with 
two or more libraries is 16%. The average school size is around 419 students (with a very 
high standard deviation). The percentage of schools that are public is 59%. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the National Level 
Variable  Mean  Stand. Deviation 
Mean Score  244,72  26,87 
Mean Parental Schooling (years)  10,35  2,29 
Mean Teacher Schooling (years)  15,96  1,19 
Percentage of Parents with 
Professional Ocuppations  0,21  0,19 
% Male Students  0,46  0,24 
Teacher Pupil Ratio  0,06  0,03 
Number of Students  418,72  299,86 
Number of Teachers  21,32  12,93 
Size of Graduating Class  78,46  67,91 
Percentage of Schools with (at 
least one) Computer Rooms  0,88    
Percentage of Schools with (at 
least one) Library  0,95    
Percentage of Public Schools  0,59    
Percentage of Urban Schools  0,84    
                                                 
4 They are the new created departments by the Constitution of 1990 (the majority of them located in the 
Amazon region), in addition of Choco, Putumayo and the main oil producer departments.  
 
b. Estimates of School Efficiency at the national level 
 
As mentioned earlier, we study differences in efficiency among schools by Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
5 First, we define the inputs and the outputs. As customary 
in the international literature
6, we use variables on teacher characteristics and school 
infrastructure to measure inputs and test scores to measure outputs. Because of the lack of 
a definitive criterion for selecting the number and type of variables to be included in the 
analysis, we run two different models. We compute efficiency scores for each model and 
examine the correlations among the scores. This strategy enables us to test the stability of 
the results.
7 Also, given the results obtained at different stages of the paper regarding the 
scale of returns in the production process, we limit the report to constant returns to scale.
8 
 
Table 2 describes the two models reported in the analysis. Model 1 uses five variables to 
measure inputs: teacher’s education and teacher-pupil ratio (the main resources present in 
the classroom), computer facilities and infirmary (proxies to the amount of resources 
outside the classroom) and the number of students (included to capture scale effects). 
Model 2 uses two outputs (test scores and the number of students) and four inputs (the 
number and the mean schooling of teachers and dummies for the existence of computer 
facilities and infirmary). With respect to previous empirical findings regarding school 
production estimates, Gaviria (2002) shows that, on average, teacher’s education, 
teacher-pupil ratios and school infrastructure are positively correlated with test scores. 
The correlation appears to be circumscribed to private schools, however. 
 
                                                 
5 Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) and Sengupta and Sfeir (1986) present studies following a similar 
methodology.  
6 Hanushek (1996) presents a general review of the literature on production of education.  
7 We present the result of two models.   We also run an additional model that explores the inclusion of 
different inputs but the result does not change and thus are not presented here.   
8 The results when assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) do not 
differ significantly, and therefore we limit the estimation to the CRS case.  
Table 2. Variables used in DEA efficiency measurements 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Inputs:     
Teacher Education  X  X 
Teacher-Pupil Ratio  X   
Number of Teachers    X 
Computer Room  X  X 
Infirmary  X  X 
Number of Students  X   
     
Outputs:     
Test scores  X  X 
Number of Students     X 
 
Model 1 is one in which the final objective of the school is the production of test scores, 
which is a proxy for the “quality” of education given by the schools. Model 2 combines 
into the objective of the school test scores and the number of children attending the 
school. In other words, both “quality” and enrolment are important objectives of the 
school. This allows us to explore the differences in objectives of different types of 
schools. Presumably for the public sector enrolment is an important objective; whereas 
for the private ones, quality is a key objective.     
  
Again, we perform two types of tests before we compute the DEA scores. On one hand, 
we run several regressions of test scores against the characteristics of the schools. On the 
other hand, based on these regressions we run a procedure to eliminated outliers from the 
sample.
9 Summary statistics of mean efficiency scores for schools in the sample are 
presented in Table 3. The minimum efficiency is 54% in the extreme case, average 
inefficiency is between 23 and 24 percent, and the percent of efficient schools is between 
1.5% and 1.2%.    
                                                 
9 We run a routine in Stata base on the filter of Hadi (1993). Again, the results are quite stable across 
different specifications, e.g. with and without outliers.    
Table 3. Average Efficiency (CRS) and Descriptive Statistics 
  Model 1  Model 2 
       
Number of Schools  2571  2583 
Mean  76,1%  77,2% 
Minimun  53,8%  54,7% 
Percentage of Efficient Schools  1,5%  1,2% 
Note: All DEA estimation exclude two types of observations:   
a) Outliers by the hadivmo prodecure and   
b) Schools located in Amazonas, Putumayo, Caqueta, Vaupés,  
Guaviare, Guanía, Vichada, Casanare, Arauca and Choco 
 
 
We proceed by running a Tobit model in order to detect factors that explain the efficiency 
of schools at the national level. Three sets of variables are used in the model as 
independent variables, all of them outside the schools’ decision power. The first set of 
variables includes percentage of male population in the schools and the average income 
of the family attending the school. The second type of variable used is a dummy 
indicating whether or not the school is public. The last set of variables captures 
characteristics of the localities in which the school operates. The main idea is to look at 
whether or not municipal characteristics influence the efficiency of schools.  
 
We analyzed several characteristics of the municipality. These can be grouped into policy 
variables and exogenous variables. Four policy variables were tested: total per capita 
investment in education by the municipality during 1994 and 1999; investment in 
education as a percentage of total spending in 1994 and 1999; number of public libraries; 
and the presence of a “house of culture”.
10 As exogenous variables we include six 
variables: the percent of schools that operate in the rural area of the municipality; the 
percent of population in the urban area; an index of quality of life in 1993; an index of 
unsatisfied basic necessities in 1993; whether the school is located in a capital of a 
department; and a fixed effects model by departments. Table 4 presents summary 
statistics of these variables.             
                                                 
10 Houses of culture are public institutions (literally, a house) in which cultural events are presented like art 
expositions and concerts, usually with the support of the municipality.   Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Municipal Information 
Variable  Mean  Stand. Deviation 
Percentage of Urban Population 
2000  0,41  0,22 
Insatisfied Needs Index (NBI) 1993  49,98  16,29 
Life Conditions Index (ICV) 1993  56,94  10,20 
Total flow of public investment in 
education per capita between 1994 
and 1999 (Thousands of 1999 
pesos) 
163,17  67,35 
Public investment in education as a 
percentage of public investment 
between 1994 and 1999 
0,25  0,04 
Percentage of Capital Cities  0,48    
Percentage of municipalities with (at 
least one) Public Library  62,30    
Percentage of municipalities with (at 
least one) Cultural Facility (Casa de 
la Cultura) 
26,60    
 
The results of the Tobit model are present in Tables 5a and 5b, which correspond to 
the estimations using efficiency scores of Model 1 and 2, respectively. Various 
conclusions can be draw from these estimations. With respect to the socioeconomic 
characteristics, the percentage of male students in the school and the educational level 
of the parents are positively and significantly correlated with the efficiency of 
schools, independent of the model used.  
 
With respect to the type of school, public schools are systematically less efficient than 
private ones if the independent variable is the efficiency measure of Model 1. The 
relationship holds for all regressions and it is statistically significant. However, when 
the independent variable is the efficiency measure from Model 2, public schools are 
more efficient than private ones: public schools perform better than private ones when 
both the enrolment and test scores are taken as the objective of the school. 
 
One striking result is the effect of the variable “urban schools,” which is an indicator 
variable for a school in an urban area (Urban=1, rural=0), on the efficiency. For 
Model 1 in which the output is just test scores, rural schools are more efficient than 
urban ones. On the contrary for Model 2, in which enrolment and test scores are the 
outputs, the variable loses significance.       
 With respect to characteristics of localities, different results emerge depending on the 
model used. Public investment in education as a percentage of public investment 
(between 1994 and 1999) is not correlated with the efficiency of schools. In plain 
words, the relative size of the expenditure is not important. With respect to the total 
flow of public investment in education per capita between 1994 and 1999, the first 
results indicate a positive and significant correlation of the variable with efficiency. 
However, the picture changes dramatically when a departmental fixed effects model is 
estimated: controlling for other departmental characteristics, on average the total flow 
of public investment in education is negatively correlated with efficiency, 
independent of the specification used.  
 
We estimated the national model with a dummy capturing the schools in Bogotá. The 
interaction of this dummy with the flow of public investment in education shows a 
positive correlation between this investment and efficiency of schools in Bogotá, 
whereas in the rest of the country the relationship is negative. In other words, the 
public investment in education in Bogotá induces a higher efficiency; the contrary 
applies to the rest of the country. Moreover, controlling by all these variables, there is 
not significant differences in the efficiency of public and private schools in Bogotá, 
independent of the model used. These results are confirmed by the in-depth analysis 
of Bogotá presented in the Appendix.           
 
Finally, with respect to indices that capture poverty (Insatisfied Needs Index of 1993), 
the results indicate no relationship between them and efficiency of schools, regardless 
of the model used. One potential problem for both variables is that they are 
constructed using the 1993 census, and the data of schools is from the year 1999. It is 
not possible to construct more recent measures due to lack of representative data at 
the municipal level.   Table 5a. Determinants of Efficiency at the National Level (Tobit Model)   
Dependent Variable: Model 1 (CRS) Efficiency Score    
Variables  Simple 






0,0243  0,0328  0,0269  0,3280  0,0333  0,0328  0,0351  0,0330 
% Male Students 
3,65  4,40  3,87  4,41  4,50  4,41  4,86  4,46 
0,0174  0,0182  0,0179  0,0180  0,0170  0,0179  0,0183  0,0178 
Mean Parental Schooling (years) 
19,79  17,90  19,17  17,75  16,55  17,36  18,40  17,63 
-0,0100  -0,0125  -0,0099  -0,0115  -0,0140  -0,0120  -0,0090  -0,0113 
Jornada No 2 
-2,43  -2,19  -2,29  -2,02  -2,47  -2,07  -1,60  -1,99 
-0,0131  -0,0172  -0,0142  -0,0167  -0,0210  -0,0175  -0,0142  -0,0168 
Jornada No 3 
-2,88  -2,63  -2,82  -2,57  -3,21  -2,60  -2,16  -2,57 
-0,0131  -0,0085  -0,0143  -0,0079  -0,0063  -0,0076  -0,0063  -0,0080 
Public Schools 
-3,71  -2,08  -3,85  -1,92  -1,53  -1,81  -1,52  -1,75 
-0,0297  -0,0277  -0,0330  -0,0297  -0,0348  -0,0303  -0,0344  -0,0337 
Urban School 
-6,69  -3,98  -7,15  -4,25  -4,94  -4,26  -4,98  -4,82 
                 
Local Public Policy Variables                 
  0,0085              Public investment in education as a 
percentage of public investment between 1994 
and 1999    0,33             
    0,0030           
Public Libaries per 1000 inhabitans 
    1,72           
      0,00004  0,00002  0,00004  -0,00016  -0,00010  Total flow of public investment in education 
per capita between 1994 and 1999 
(Thousands of 1999 pesos) 
         2,84  1,70  2,67  -3,09  -3,13 
Municipal Variables                 
Insatisfied Needs Index (NBI) 1993          -0,0007                 -4,38       
          0,002     
Capital City 
          0,4500     
              0,00012 
Dummy Bogota X Public invest. in educ. 
              4,36 
              0,002 
Dummy Bogota X Public School 
              0,21 
0,6162  0,6056  0,6136  0,6025  0,6409  0,6030  0,6409  0,6248 
Constant 
54,64  38,60  50,78  42,30  38,51  42,22  37,64  41,36 
Observations  2.571  1.561  2.327  1.561  1.561  1.561  1.561  1.530 




Table 5b. Determinants of Efficiency at the National Level (Tobit Model)   
Dependent Variable: Model 2 (CRS) Efficiency Score    
Variables  Simple 






0,0180  0,0259  0,0199  0,0260  0,0264  0,0260  0,0290  0,0262 
% Male Students 
2,90  3,57  3,07  3,60  3,70  3,61  4,20  3,66 
0,0194  0,0193  0,0195  0,0190  0,0177  0,0188  0,0191  0,0187 
Mean Parental Schooling (years) 
23,84  19,80  22,58  19,65  18,10  19,14  20,60  19,47 
0,0068  0,0045  0,0064  0,0056  0,0021  0,0046  0,0064  0,0047 
Jornada No 2 
1,78  0,81  1,54  1,03  0,39  0,83  1,19  0,87 
0,0122  0,0069  0,0114  0,0074  0,0015  0,0059  0,0074  0,0057 
Jornada No 3 
2,73  1,09  2,44  1,18  0,24  0,91  1,19  0,88 
0,0292  0,0345  0,0302  0,0352  0,0376  0,0359  0,0384  0,0320 
Public Schools 
8,92  8,64  8,70  8,87  9,55  8,89  9,68  7,24 
0,0052  0,0044  0,0027  0,0014  -0,0050  0,0002  -0,0024  -0,0035 
Urban School 
1,25  0,66  0,63  0,20  -0,08  0,03  -0,37  -0,53 
                 
Local Public Policy Variables                 
  0,0284              Public investment in education as a 
percentage of public investment between 
1994 and 1999 
  1,15             
    -0,0016           
Public Libaries per 1000 inhabitans 
    -0,99           
      0,00006  0,00004  0,00006  -0,00023  -0,00011  Total flow of public investment in education 
per capita between 1994 and 1999 
(Thousands of 1999 pesos) 
         4,35  2,79  4,03  -4,35  -3,27 
Municipal Variables                         -0,0010       
Insatisfied Needs Index (NBI) 1993 
        -6,03       
          0,004     
Capital City 
          0,9100     
              0,00012 
Dummy Bogota X Public invest. in educ. 
              4,61 
              0,015 
Dummy Bogota X Public School 
              1,83 
0,5384  0,5369  0,5389  0,5365  0,5876  0,5375  0,5944  0,5659 
Constant 
51,43  35,35  48,02  39,09  36,76  39,07  36,78  39,03 
Observations  2.583  1.562  2.333  1.562  1.561  1.562  1.562  1.536 
t values under the coefficients                 
 In conclusion, there is evidence of differences in the efficiencies of private and public 
schools in the nation as a whole. Public schools are relatively inefficient in producing 
test scores but they are relatively efficient producing test scores and enrolment of 
students. In terms of expenditures, on average the municipalities that invest more 
funds in education are more inefficient. Bogotá is the exception. Finally, the 
characteristics of the families are an important determinant of the efficiency of 
schools.    
 
4.  The role of prices 
 
The previous analysis considers only physical inputs. It can be argued, however, that 
the bulk of the inefficiencies of public schools has more to do with input prices than 
with the use of physical inputs. If inputs prices (notably salaries) are higher in public 
than in private schools, the difference could be much larger. The same point is made 
by Hoxby (2002) for the United States: “even if researchers were to find that public 
and private schools produce identical achievement, it would probably be true that 
private schools were considerably more productive (because they spend less on 
average).” This section looks at the differences in wages between private and public 
teacher with an eye in getting a sense of the differences in input costs between the two 
types of schools. Because salaries represent such a larger share of total education 
expenses and teacher-pupil ratios do not differ substantially between the two, the 
difference in costs will be closely associated with the differences in wages.
11 The next 
section will look at this conjecture in detail.  
   
The current regulations of the teaching profession in Colombia have their origin in an 
educational statute (Estatuto Docente) promulgated in 1979. This statute specifies the 
norms that regulate the recruitment, labor stability, promotion, and retirement of 
teachers. The statute introduced a number of inefficiencies into public education. 
Most notably, teacher salaries are set by the central government, with little input from 
the regional agencies that end up paying the bill. Moreover, the directives (rectors) do 
not exercise any disciplinary control over the teachers. The Estatuto Docente orders 
                                                 
11 See Gaviria (2001) for a comparison of teacher-pupil ratios between private and public schools.  that promotions be determined internally within the teaching profession, using a set of 
rules that are not always related to the teaching activities.
12 
 
The analysis is based on the September round of the 1999 Colombian household 
survey (ENH). This survey has national coverage and its representative for both the 
country as a whole and urban and rural areas taken separately. The survey allows for 
the identification of public workers and public and private teachers. A worker is a 
public school teacher if she reports an occupation of “teacher” in the ENH and works 
in the public sector. A worker is a private school teacher if she reports an occupation 
of teacher and works in the private sector. 
 
Before studying the wage differentials between public and private teachers, a word 
about the recent evolution of the wages of public teachers is in order. Table 6 reports 
growth rate in teacher salaries between 1994 and 1999. Although the real teacher 
salary declined slightly in 1995, it rose considerably since then, at an annual rate of 
about 3 percent. To the extent that this pattern was circumscribed to public teachers, if 
could have caused sizable wage differentials between private and public teachers. 




Percent real growth of teacher’s 
salaries in the public sector 
1995  -0.4 
1996  2.9 
1997  3.2 
1998  6.3 
1999  2.2 




Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analysis. On average, 
public teachers have 15 years of schooling, a level slightly above that of private 
teachers but well above that of a typical worker laboring in either the public or private 
sector. Public teachers have almost five years more of experience than private 
                                                 
12 See Acosta and Borjas (2002) for an in depth analysis of the institutions that regulate public 
education in Colombia.  teachers and have salaries, at least, 15 percent higher. It remains to be seen, however, 
the extent to which this percentage shrinks once we control for teacher’s experience 
and place of residence.   
 
Table 8 presents the estimation results of a series of Mincer equations. The dependent 
variable is the log of monthly wages. Independent variables include years of 
schooling, experience, experience squared as well as dummy variables identifying 
public workers and public and private teachers. Only individuals who were employed 
at time of the survey were included in the sample. Column (1) shows that public 
teachers earn more than other workers with the same experience and education. The 
wage differentials between public teachers and non-teachers are close to eight percent.   
 
Column (2) shows that public teachers do not earn higher wages than comparable 
public employees. If anything, public employees have slightly higher wages than 
public teachers. In contrast, column (3) shows that public school teachers earn much 
more than private school teachers: the wage differentials are close to 15 percent in this 
case. 
 
Thus, if we take into account the differences in salaries between private and public 
Schooling Experience Male Worker Monthly earnings
All workers 9,0 25,6 0,64 471593
(4.8) (13.0) (643569)
Public employees* 9,7 26,8 0,62 596147
(4.9) (12.7) (748604)
Public teachers 15,2 25,6 0,35 897521
(2.4) (9.5) (937485)
Private teachers 14,7 20,8 0,32 767095
(2.5) (10.6) (933956)
* It doesn't include teachers. Standard deviations in parentheses
Table 7. Labor Market Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Schooling 0,120 0,117 0,120
(107.4) (103.9) (105.8)
Experience 0,053 0,052 0,053
(44.3) (43.0) (44.4)
Experience
2 -0,0005 -0,0005 -0,0005
(29.7) (28.9) (29.7)
Dummy male worker 0,188 0,191 0,187
(20.9) (21.3) (20.7)
Dummy public teacher 0,084 0,144 0,079
(4.1) (6.9) (3.8)
Dummy public employee 0,204
(17.7)
Dummy private teacher -0,059
(2.2)




All regressions include regional dummies.
Table 8. Teachers's wages: private versus public teachers, efficiency differences between private and public schools can be much 
higher than previously estimated. If one assumes that public schools are, on average, 
less efficient than private schools (a result in line with the evidence of section 3 and 
the Appendix) and that public school teachers earn 15 more than comparable private 
schools teachers (a result in line with the evidence of this section), public schools will 
be, at least, 11 percent less efficient than private schools. Seemingly, a lot is to be 
gained by increasing efficiency in public schools. 
 
Moreover, this difference can be higher if we take into account the differences in 
pensions benefits between public and private teachers. As Table 9 shows, the pension 
benefits granted to teachers are extremely generous.
13 The table compares the pension 
benefits available to teachers with those established in Law 100 of 1993 (Law of 
Social Security Reform) for other workers in Colombia. A number of differences are 
worth noting. First, public teachers do not have to contribute to the funding of the 
system in order to receive a pension. In contrast, most non-teachers contribute 25% 
(of which 13.5% is obligatory). Second, teachers qualify to receive a special pension 
(pensión de gracia) at 50 years of age. Under the pay-as-you-go system set up by Law 
100 of 1993 for non-teachers, the retirement age is 55 for women and 60 for men. 
Third, a different base salary is used to calculate the pension for teachers and non-
teachers. The special pension is based on the basic monthly salary that the teacher had 
at  the  time  of  retirement,  including  bonuses  and  other  benefits.  In  addition,  the 
teacher’s retirement pension is based on the average salary of the last year employed. 
In contrast, the pension benefits for non-teachers are based on the average salary in 
the last 10 years of the entire career if more than 1,250 weeks have been contributed. 
And  finally,  teachers  typically  receive  75  percent  of  the  base  salary,  while  non-
teachers receive between 65 and 85 percent, depending on the number of weeks that 
the worker contributed to the system. 
 
                                                 
13 This discussion is taken from Acosta and Borjas (2002). Table 9. Pension Benefit Regimes of the Magistery and Law 100 of 1993 
 
Benefits  Special Pension 
14
 
Pensión de Gracia 
Retirement Pension 
15
  Retirement Pension by 
old age 
Law 100/93 
Beneficiaries  National Teachers, 
nationalized and 










Persons that reach the 
age of mandatory 
retirement and do not 
have own resources for 
their subsistence. 
Affiliated with the pay-
as-you-go system. 
Time of Service  Typically 20 years  Typically 20 years  He/she is in active 
service with any time of 
services. 
1000 weeks. Worker 
saves capital that 
generates at least one 
pension equal to 110% of 
the minimum salary.  
Age  50 years, Men or 
Women 
If hired after 1-1-90, 50 
years for women, 55 
years for men; if hired 
before 1-1-90, 50 years 
for men and women. 
 
55 years old  55 years old women and 
60 years old men 
Contribution  Nation in charge.  Nation in charge  Nation in charge  13.5% until 4 minimum 
wages. 
14.5% for 4 minimum 
wages and more. 
75% paid by employer 
and 25% by worker 





bonuses and benefits 
Average salary during 
the last year of service.  
Last monthly salary 
earned. 
Average salary in the last 
10 years or in the whole 
work life if he/she has 


























20%, plus 25% for each 







65% with 1.000 weeks of 
contribution, until 85% 
with 1.400 weeks. 
Individual Saving 
Depends on the capital 
accumulated on the 
individual saving account 
Source: Acosta and Borjas (2002). 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The analysis yields three main results.  First, public schools are, on average, relatively 
inefficient in providing test scores but are relatively efficient providing test scores and 
enrolment. Second, given the input prices, public schools are relatively more 
inefficient than private ones. It can be argued that an important and critical objective 
                                                 
14 The Nation is in charge of the Special Pension and it is recognized and paid by CAJANAL. The Law established 
that the Fondo de Pensiones Públicas-FOPEP should do it. 
15  The  Nation  is  in  charge  of  all  Retirement  Pension  that  began  since  the  promulgation  of  Law 91  of  1989 
(December 29) and will be paid by the Fondo Nacional de Prestaciones Sociales of the Magistery. But CAJANAL 
and the Fondo Nacional de Ahorros will be in charge if it is started before the date of promulgagion of that law. 
16 Law 91 of 1989. For the teachers who entered the system since January 1st of 1981, national and nationalized, 
and for those appointed since 1990, when they accomplished the legal requirements, only one retirement pension is 
recognized, equivalent to 75% of the monthly average salary of the last year. 
17 Workers Nacionalized, they are the teachers that enter the system by appointment of a territorial entity before 
January 1st of  1976 and those who entered since that date, according with the established by the Law 43 of 1975 of public education is universal coverage. Moreover, based on the externalities of 
education and on capital market failures, the intervention of the State in terms of 
quantity of education is critical. However, the analysis shows that there is ample room 
for the improvement of public schools, both in terms of the quality and the cost of 
inputs.  
 
The case of Bogotá, in comparison with the rest of the country, shows another 
important result. On average, increasing the share of investment in education results 
in inefficiency. Increased spending does not imply better efficiency in the production 
of test scores or in coverage. However, Bogotá differentiate itself from the rest of the 
country in this aspect: money matters in the production quality and quantity. Probably 
part of the “unexpected” result of insignificant differences in the efficiency of public 
and private schools in Bogotá depends on this factor. Bogotá is using the public 
investment in education in an efficient matter.  
 
As conclusions we pose two non-competing hypotheses that explain this last result. 
First, the recent mayors of the District of Bogotá have improved in a substantial way 
the administration of education. Second, as show by the data, the number of public 
schools in Bogotá is lower than in the rest of the country. This can lead to an 
argument of competition: more competition from part of private schools induce more 
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  a. Data 
 
For the case of Bogotá, our sample includes 707 schools and almost 50.000 students. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. Mean 
test scores are around 260 points over a theoretical maximum of 400 points. Parental 
schooling is slightly above ten years, whereas teachers’ schooling is above 15 years. 
The teacher-pupil ratio is 0.06, the fraction of schools with computer facilities 0.84 
and the fraction with infirmary 0.34. Average school size is about 700 hundred 
students, although the standard deviation is very high. The fraction of public schools 
is 0.34. Observe some significant differences between Bogotá and the aggregate data: 
Mainly, mean test scores are higher, average school size is bigger and the proportion 
of public schools is also bigger.  
 
b. Estimates of School Efficiency  
 
Table 2 presents basic information on the distribution of efficiency scores for the three 
models under analysis. Three facts are immediately clear from the table. First, 
efficiency differences across schools are considerable: they exceed 50 percent in the 
polar cases. Second, average inefficiency appears to be greater than 20 percent but 
smaller than 30 percent.  And third, the fraction of efficient schools never exceeds six 
percent. As expected, the variation of efficiency scores is smaller under the 
Mean Stand. Deviation
Mean Score 266.86 28.58
Mean Parental Schooling 10.05 2.81
Percentage of Parents
with Professional Ocupations 0.25
Teacher's Education 15.37 1.37
Teacher-Pupil Ratio 0.06 0.02
Percentage of Schools with
Infirmary 0.34
Percentage of Schools with
Computer Facilities 0.84
Size of Graduating Class 73.56 55.86
Number of Students in School 674.68 485.21
Percentage of Public Schools 0.34
Table 1. Descriptive Statisticsassumption of VRS. In addition, average and minimum efficiency are larger under in 
VRS than in CRS. 
 
 
Using different combinations of inputs and outputs can alter the rankings of individual 
schools. We study the change in the rankings by looking at the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between the three models described earlier. Table 3 presents 
the main results. Regardless of whether CRS or VRS is assumed, no big differences 
are apparent. The largest difference occurs between models 1 and 3, where the 
correlation coefficients are below 0.8.
18   
 
For policy purposes, it is important to understand how efficiency is related to 
variables amenable to policy changes. As a basic rule in our analysis, factors that can 
be easily influenced by the school are included in the DEA models, whereas factors 
beyond the scope of decision making power of schools are used to explain the 
differences in efficiency. The latter factors include average socioeconomic 
characteristics of the schools and whether or not the school is public. Indeed, one of 
the main goals of this exercise is to gauge the differences between private and public 
schools in terms of efficiency. 
 
As efficiency scores are bounded between the [0, 1] interval, and there always one or 
more observations at upper limit, we use a Tobit model to study the determinants of 
efficiency. The main results are presented in Table 4. Two results are worthy of 
                                                 
18 These models differ in the way they treat the total number of students: model 1 treats it as an input 
whereas model 3 does it as an output. 
CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS
Mean 75,3% 78,7% 71,4% 75,3% 75,2% 77,8%
Minimium 53,5% 55,7% 46,5% 53,1% 51,8% 55,9%
Percentage Share
of Efficient Schools
2.83% 5.66% 1.56% 3.11% 3.39% 5.94%
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 2. Average Efficiency and Descriptive Statistics
Model 1 Model 2
Model 2 0.81 (CRS)
0.83 (VRS)
Model 3 0.77(CRS) 0.85 (CRS)
0.79 (VRS) 0.89 (VRS)
Table 3. Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Modelsmention. First, mean parental schooling is systematically related to school efficiency: 
each year of parental schooling diminishes inefficiency by approximately one 
percentage point. And second, relative efficiency of public schools depends on the 
model used. In the cases that are significant, the inefficiency of public schools is 
small. In the rest, there are not relative efficiency differences between public and 






Percentage of Male 0,023 0,036 0,007 0,014 0,019 0,028
Students (1.62) (2.76)** (-0.50) (-0.97) (-1.21) (-1.83)
Percentage of Parents -0,014 -0,071 -0,009 -0,035 -0,035 -0,056
with Professional Occupations (0.54) (2.51)* (0.32) (1.12) (1.20) (1.70)
Mean Parental Schooling 0,004 0,010 0,008 0,010 0,006 0,007
(1.75) (3.85)** (3.13)** (3.69)** (2.10)* (2.40)*
Public school -0,052 -0,039 -0,006 -0,007 -0,007 -0,019
(6.57)** (5.12)** (0.70) (0.85) (0.75) (2.11)*
Size of Graduating Class -0,00031 0,00003 0,00033
(5.14)** (0.52) (4.74)**
Constant 0,722 0,686 0,637 0,607 0,700 0,661
(35.82)** (32.57)** (29.84)** (25.99)** (31.23)** (27.18)**
Observations 706 662 706 662 706 662
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 4. Determinants of efficiency (Tobit models)
Dependent variable: efficiency score (CRS)